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ANTITRUST AND LABOR 
Russell A. Smith* 
THE thirteen-page treatment of the subject of "organized labor" in the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to 
Study the Antitrust Laws shows that the committee approached the 
subject gingerly, and that the counsel of moderation prevailed. The 
views of those who would change the national policy favoring (or at 
least tolerating) the existing institutions of trade unionism and col-
lective bargaining by subjecting unions to "monopoly" standards are 
not discussed in the Report.1 The result is a limited and generalized 
approach, which holds that some kinds of union practices "aimed di-
rectly at commercial market restraints" run counter to our national anti-
trust policy and should be prohibited by some law. With but two dis-
senting voices the committee says: 
" . . . This Committee believes that union actions aimed at 
directly fixing the kind or amount of products which may be used, 
produced or sold, their market price, the geographical area in 
which they may be used, produced or sold, or the number of firms 
which may engage in their production or distribution are contrary 
to antitrust policy. To the best of our knowledge, no national 
union Hatly claims the right to engage in such activities. We be-
lieve that where the concession demanded from an employer as 
prerequisite to ordering the cessation of coercive action against him 
is participation in such a scheme for market control, this union 
conduct should be prohibited by some statute."2 
Most observers will agree with this expression of policy, though many, 
with the dissenters, will be apprehensive of a statutory formulation of 
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 These views are well illustrated by the Gwinn-Fisher Bill, H.R. 8449, 82d Cong., 
2d sess. (1952). For discussions of these proposals, see Iserman, "The Labor Monopoly 
Problem: Gwinn-Fisher Bill Would Effect Reforms," 38 A.B.A.J. 743 (1952); and 
Kamin, "The Fiction of 'Labor Monopoly': A Reply to Mr. Iserman," id. at 748. 
The Gwinn-Fisher bill would not only cover direct commercial restraints of the kind 
envisaged by the antitrust committee's proposal, but, in addition, would attempt to elim-
inate what Mr. Iserman refers to as "centralized control of bargaining." This would be 
accomplished by making illegal multiple employer bargaining or concerted action, and con-
certed action among unions, in relation to wages and other terms of employment, except 
in the case of small, local labor market bargaining units numbering not more than 5,000 · 
employees. 
2 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws, March 31, 1955, p. 294 (hereinafter referred to as REPORT, followed by the 
page number). 
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this proposition in such general terms that "potential abuse" will be 
invited.3 
The committee's failure to discuss the basic economic issues raised 
by the existence of union power doubtless reB.ects its judgment of the 
scope of its assignment. "At the outset," the Report begins, "we em-
phasize that appraisal of the Nation's labor-management relations 
policy goes beyond this antitrust study."4 Thus the committee assumed, 
on the one hand, that the national labor policy is to encourage collec-
tive bargaining on terms and conditions of employment/ and, on the 
other hand, that the national antitrust policy is the "promotion of com-
petition in open markets."6 The committee evidently believed that it 
was not called upon to evaluate the one policy as against the other, but 
was to view-each p-olicyas of-equal standing· :tn the national hierarchy 
of values. Thus, it accepted as its responsibility only an inquiry into 
"those union activities, not directed at such established [i.e., recog-
nized] union ends, but instead at direct restraints on commercial com-
petition."7 Constituted as the committee was, I think this was a wise 
decision. At the same time it must be recognized that the proponents 
and opponents of an antitrust curb on union power as such may fairly 
claim that this issue was not considered on the merits. 
Even within the comparatively narrow jurisdictional limits set by 
the committee, it has not undertaken to make a first-hand examination 
of the relevant facts. One gathers that primary reliance has been 
placed upon "reported cases," relatively few in number, to show the 
existence of the practices which the committee condemns. 8 This is 
consistent with the general thesis of the committee, underlying its en-
tire report, that its "aim is not to add to the storehouse of statistical 
data or to survey the economic effects of antitrust applications to spe-
cific industries" but, rather, "to weave as coherent a pattern as possible 
in the light of the differences and seeming inconsistencies of the legisla-
tive and judicial strands that make up our antitrust fabric" in the hope 
3 Thus, in a dissent filed by Walter Adams, and concurred in by Raymond Dickey, 
the point is made that "to the extent that the limits of challenged union conduct are de-
fined in terms of 'object' (i.e., intent), the proposal is subject to potential abuse." RE'· 
.PORT 305. 
4 REPORT 293. 
Ii Ibid. 
6REPORT 1. 
7 RE.PORT 294. 
s "Reported- cases indicate, however, that some unions have engaged in some practices 
aimed directly at commercial market restraints by fixing the kind or amount of products 
which may be sold in any area or their market price." REPORT 304. 
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that "clarification" will yield better guides to those concemed.9 With 
respect to trade union practices, this "clarification" consists in show-
ing that existing law deals to some extent with the subject, hut, as the 
committee thinks, incompletely. The logic appears to he that existing 
law shows that the practices in question are not justifiable, and that 
the problem is simply to close gaps and round out enforcement. This 
is a plausible methodology, hut it involves the risk of criticism that the 
exact dimensions of the problems under consideration have not been 
taken.10 
The committee's approach makes its analysis of existing federal 
law very important. This consists of examination of "antitrust cover-
age" and of the "relevant provisions of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947." The committee has furnished us with a succinct 
and useful analysis of the pertinent statutes and decisions. 
The Survey of Antitrust Coverage 
The survey of antitrust coverage reviews, in about eight printed 
pages, the history and present status of trade unions under the Sher-
man Act. The Report begins with a summary of the 1908 decision of 
the Court in the Danbury Hatters11 case, and treats next the judicial 
delimitation of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act in the Duplex1-2 
and Bedford Cut Stone13 cases. Proceeding chronologically, it finds 
that a key distinction emerged in the Coronado14 and Apex15 cases be-
9lu!J.>ORT 4. 
10'fhus, the dissenting statement_ of Walter Adams states: ''In dissenting, I am not 
unmindful of the concern over allegedly widespread labor abuses. I believe, however, that 
corrective legislation-if, when and by whomsoever proposed-should be based on a care-
ful and comprehensive investigation of all the facts within the context of market reality." 
Rm>oRT 305-306. 
11 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301 (1908). 
12 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172 (1921). For 
comments on this case, see 21 CoL. L. REv. 258 (1921); 34 HARv. L. REv. 880 at 885 
(1921); 1 W1s. L. REv. 186 (1921); Mason, ''The Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act," 
18 AM. PoL. Sm. REv. 489 (1924); and Powell, ''The Supreme Court's Control Over 
the Issuance of Injunctions in Labor Disputes," 13 Pnoc. AM. PoL. Sm. AssN. 37 at 49-54 
(1928). 
13 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 
522 (1927). 
14 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 
570 (1922); 268 U.S. 295, 45 S.Ct. 551 (1925). 
15 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940). For comments 
on this case, see Brown, "The Apex Case and Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the 
Anti-Trust Laws," 21 Bos-r. UNIV. L. REv. 48 (1941); Gregory, "The Sherman Act v. 
Labor," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 222 (1941); Cavers, ''Labor v. Sherman Act," 8 UNIV. 
Cm. L. REv. 246 (1941); Landis, "The Apex Case," 26 CoRN. L. Q. 191 (1941); 
Steffen, ''Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Apex Case,'' 50 YALE L. J. 787 
(1941); and notes in 54 HARv. L. REv. 146 (1940), and 39 Micg. L. REv. 462 (1941). 
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tween union activities aimed at "furthering rightful union objectives" 
and activities aimed at suppressing commercial competition. Finally, 
it considers the limiting impact of United States v. Hutcheson16 and 
the broadening impact of Allen-Bradley.11 These and related cases 
are, of course, familiar to students of labor law. The committee essays 
to interpret, not to appraise, these decisions. In this group of cases 
the Coronado-Apex, Hutcheson, and Allen-Bradley trilogy are ob-
viously the most important. 
In Coronado and Apex the Court had to consider primary union 
concerted action, unlawful by standards of tort law,18 directed for rec-
ognition or organizational purposes against a mine operator and a 
hosiery manufacturer, respectively. The violent conduct involved 
clearly was not immunized by section 20 of the Clayton Act. How-
ever, this fact alone did not, by inverse reasoning, require the conclu-
sion that the Sherman Act could be applied. The Court held, in line 
with established doctrine, that the act was not designed to provide an 
additional federal remedy against violence affecting interstate com-
merce but; rather, to deal with conduct specifically aimed at market 
restrictions.19 The Court ruled that this intent could not be predi-
cated alone on the reduction through strike action of the supply of a 
product entering interstate commerce, but had to involv~ the specific 
purpose "to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in in-
16 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941). For discussions of this case see Cavers, "And 
What of the Apex Case Now?" 8 UNIV. Cm. L. Iu!v. 516 (1941); Gregory, ''The New 
Sherman-Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia Act," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 503 (1941); Carey, 
''The Apex and Hutcheson Cases," 25 MINN. L. RBv. 915 (1941); Tunks, "A New 
Federal Charter for Trade Unionism," 41 CoL. L. Iu!v. 969 (1941); Teller, "Federal In-
tervention in Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining-the Hutcheson Case," 40 MrCH. 
L. RBv. 24 (1941); Steffen, "Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade; The Hutcheson 
Case," 36 !LL. L. RBv. 1 (1941); Nathanson and Wirtz, ''The Hutcheson Case: An-
other View," 36 !LL. L. RBv. 41 (1941); and notes in 41 CoL. L. Iu!v. 532 (1941), 29 
GEo. L. J. 770 (1941), 9 GEo. WASH. L. RBv. 724 (1941), and 89 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 
827 (1941). 
17 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945). See Dodds, "The Supreme Court and Organized 
Labor, 1941-1945," 58 HARv. L. RBv. 1018 (1945), and notes in 45 CoL. L. RBv. 272 
(1945), 58 HARv. L. RBv. 273 (1944), and 43 Mrca L. RBv. 818 (1945). 
18 In Coronado, the Union used tactics of physical violence, and in Apex the Union 
used the "sit-down" strike. 
19 Jn Apex, Justice Stone said, for the Court: ''These cases [referring to the Coronado 
cases, among others] show that activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton 
Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act. Underlying and implicit in all of them 
is recognition that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police interstate transportation, or 
to afford a remedy for wrongs, which are actionable under state law, and result from combina-
tions and conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose and effect, of any form of mar-
ket control of a commodity, such as to 'monopolize the supply, control its price, or discrim-
inate between its would-be purchasers.'" Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 at 
512, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940). 
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terstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets."20 This 
formulation of the rule led to a retrial in Coronado, in which the re-
quired motivation was held to have been established. In Apex no such 
showing was made, so the action against the union was dismissed. 
"From this decision," according to the committee's analysis, "there 
emerges a distinction, deemed essential by this committee, between 
union activities aiming, on the one hand, at furthering rightful union 
objectives and, on the other hand, at directly 'suppressing [commercial] 
competition or fixing prices' of commercial products."21 The com-
mittee evidently considers that this distinction may have continuing 
vitality despite United States v. Hutcheson, and, on this basis, it con-
cludes, as its first proposition by way of summarizing existing law, 
that "where the union engages in fraud or violence and intends or 
achieves some direct commercial restraint," it "may be" vulnerable to 
Sherman Act proceedings. 22 
The committee has, I think, treated a little too cavalierly the 
Coronado-Apex cases. These cases did, indeed, narrow the scope of 
the Sherman Act in relation to trade union activities by emphasizing 
that liability had to be founded upon some direct and intentiqnal con-
nection between the union's activities and market restraint or control.23 
Yet the evidence which the Court ultimately found sufficient, in the 
second Coronado opinion, to establish liability was nothing more nor 
less than a concern of the embattled United Mine Workers that non-
union coal from the Bache-Denman mines upon entering the inter-
state market might seriously endanger wage scales prevailing in union-
ized mines.24 It is significant, however, that the union's conduct was 
20 Ibid. 
21 RBPOR'I' 296. 
22 RBPOR'I' 299. 
23 This kind of intent was not required in the early interstate secondary boycott cases, 
such as Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301 (1908). 
24 Note the following, for example, from the second opinion: 
"Part of the new evidence was an extract from the convention proceedings of District 
No. 21 at Fort Smith, Arkansas, in February, 1914, in which the delegates discussed the 
difficulties presented in their maintenance of the union scale in Arkansas, Oklahoma and 
Texas because of the keen competition from the non-union £elds of Southern Colorado and 
the non·union £elds of the South in Alabama and Tennessee. Stewart, the president, 
called attention to a new £eld in Oklahoma which he said would be a great competitor 
of union coal £elds, and that District No. 21 would be forced to call a strike to bring into 
line certain operators in that section, and in the event that they did so the District would 
£ght such a conflict to the bitter end regardless of cost. They also discussed a proposal 
to reduce the scale at the union mines at McCurtain, Oklahoma, which Stewart advocated, 
in order that the McCurtain operators might be put on a proper competitive basis in inter-
state markets with other operators. Several of the delegates at this convention took part in 
the riot of April 6th and the battle of July 17th following." 268 U.S. 295 at 306-307, 
45 S.Ct. 551 (1925). 
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in the setting of a decision by the Coronado Company to abandon the 
union shop and the union wage scale. Basically, the union sought to 
compel the company to rescind this decision. Concern with the pro-
tection of employment standards in organized areas is surely present 
in many, if not most, union recognition campaigns. While Justice 
Stone reiterated with apparent approval in the Apex opinion the anti-
trust-labor formula stated in Coronado, there is reason to doubt, from 
other observations in his opinion, that the Court in 1940 would have 
held this element alone sufficient to establish Sherman Act liability.25 
Moreover, I doubt that this organizational motivation for concerted ac-
tion is intended by the committee to be included as one of the "specific 
union activities which have as their direct object direct control of the 
market ... ,"26 and which should therefore be prohibited by law, for 
any such proposal would be inconsistent with the national "labor-
management relations policy," which the committee accepts. I think 
we must credit the committee simply with approval of the general 
formulation of antitrust doctrine in Coronado and Apex., and not read 
its analysis and recommendation as an underwriting of the specific 
decision in Coronado. 
A fairly persuasive argument can be made, as a matter of fact, that 
the Court in the later Hutcheson and Allen-Bradley cases actually 
moved away from the Coronado-Apex formula to a position which ex-
cludes union activities from antitrust coverage except where they are 
part of a concert with employers to accomplish objectives outlawed by 
the Sherman Act. In Hutcheson the Court used the now famous "inter-
25 The following interesting paragraph appears in Justice Stone's opinion in Apex 
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 at 503-504, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940): · 
"Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to compel employers to 
yield to their demand, may restrict to some extent the power of employers who are parties 
to the dispute to compete in the market with those not subject to such demands. But 
under the doctrine applied to non-labor cases, the mere fact of such restrictions on competi-
tion does not in itself bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation of the 
Sherman Act. Appalachian Coals v. United States, supra, 360. Furthermore, successful 
union activity, as for example consummation of a wage agreement with employers, may 
have some influence on price competition by eliminating that part of such competition which 
is based on differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a labor combination 
effective it must eliminate the competition frolll non-union made goods, see American Steel 
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, an elimination of price 
competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor 
organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of 
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. See Levering & Garrigues 
Co. v. Morrin, supra; cf. American Foundries case, supra, 209; National Association of 
Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403." 
It may be questioned whether the United Mine Workers, in Coronado, was really 
seeking anything more than the "'elimination of price competition based on labor standards." 
26 R.l!.PORT 304. 
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lacing statutes" rationale to immunize peaceful jurisdictional strike 
and boycott conduct from liability under the Sherman Act. It rea-
soned that since such conduct is not enjoinable under section 4 of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and since a primary purpose of the Norris Act 
was to repudiate the narrow construction which had been placed on 
section 20 of the Clayton Act, Congress must have intended that the 
general immunity granted by section 20 to kinds of conduct made non-
enjoinable should be extended to conduct protected against injunction 
by the Norris Act.27 The most interesting point about this analysis, 
for present purposes, lies in the fact that it was really unnecessary, 
for, as Justice Stone pointed out in his concurring opinion, union non-
liability was clear under previous decisions of the Court, especially 
Apex. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Justice Frank-
furter and his associates joining in the majority opinion, who did not 
even discuss the Coronado and Apex cases, deliberately chose an ap-
proach to union Sherman Act coverage different from and narrower 
than that laid down previously. The shift seems to have been away 
from a doctrine which required an examination of specific union ob-
jectives or intentions and toward a rule which inquires simply whether 
the union is engaging in peaceful concerted action in connection with 
a labor dispute. It is clear, at least, that the Hutcheson doctrine would 
reject antitrust coverage of union strike action for Coronado-type ob-
jectives in the absence of violence. 
The question, then, is whether Sherman Act liability would con-
ceivably be permitted to turn simply on the question whether union 
conduct in connection with a labor dispute is violent (hence enjoin-
able despite Norris Act limitations) or non-violent (hence nonenjoin-
able). The committee evidently believes that this may be so, despite 
the point emphasized in Apex and other cases that the Sherman Act 
was not designed simply to police violence. The 1945 decision in 
the Allen-Bradley case is the most recent general treatment of the 
question, and the language used in the opinion is therefore significant. 
27 The opinion, by Justice Frankfurter, states: 
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the fetters upon trade union activities, which 
according to judicial construction §20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched, by still fur-
ther narrowing the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant injunctions 
in labor disputes. More especially, the Act explicitly formulated the 'public policy of the 
United States' in regard to the industrial conflict, and by its light established that the 
allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in the Duplex case, 
to an immediate employer-employee relation. Therefore, whether trade union conduct con-
stitutes a violation of the Sherman Act is to be determined only by reading the Sherman 
Law and §20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of 
outlawcy of labor conduct." 312 U.S. 219 at 231, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941). 
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The holding was that a union which had entered into formal agree-
ments with manufacturers which were designed to protect an area 
price structure by excluding non-area products from the area market 
and to give the area union a monopoly on area work was equally guilty 
under the Sherman Act with the manufacturers, even though the union 
acted in pursuit of "their own interests as wage earners."28 The 
Court reviewed the history of labor under the act ( without, however, 
mentioning the Coronado cases). Apex, it said, left labor unions still 
subject to the act to "'some extent not defined.'" The Hutcheson 
doctrine was restated approvingly, with the observation that the union 
action which lay in the background in Allen-Bradley (threats of peace-
ful -strikes and boycotts) would not have been a violation of the Sher-
man Act had there been no "union-contractor-manufacturer combina-
tion," even though the union, acting alone, might, as the "natural con-
sequence" of its activities, have produced an exclusion of outside prod-
ucts from the market. The Court concluded, "Our holding means 
that the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation of 
the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in 
combination with business groups."29 The general tenor of the opinion 
justifies the view that the Court regarded traditional types of union 
concerted action as excluded from Sherman Act coverage where used 
in connection with a "labor dispute," except only where they are used 
specifically to aid a business combination. The Court could have 
stated expressly, either in Hutcheson or in Allen-Bradley, that the gen-
eral exclusion of union action from the Sherman Act would be deemed 
forfeited if a union resorted to non-peaceful concerted action, but it 
did not do so. 
The committee's next proposition is that commercial restraints by 
unions may be vulnerable to antitrust proceedings "where the union 
activity is not in the course of a labor dispute as defined in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." This suggests that even peaceful types of union 
concerted action may be subject to the Sherman Act in some circum-
stances. The Report cites the Hawaiian Tuna Packers3° and Colum-
bia River Packers Association31 cases as the primary basis for this con-
28 The opinion, by Justice Black, states: "Our problem in this case is therefore a 
very narrow one-do labor unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to further their 
own interests as wage earners, they aid and abet business men to do the precise things which 
that Act prohibits?" 325 U.S. 797 at 801, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945). 
29 325 U.S. 797 at 810, 65 S.Ct., 1533 (1945). 
30Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's 
Union, (D.C. Hawaii 1947) 72 F. Supp. 562. 
31 Columbia River Packer's Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 62 S.Ct. 520 (1942). 
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clusion. In each of these cases there were involved, within the 
"union," individuals (fishermen) whom the Court considered to be 
independent entrepreneurs, not employees, and the Court viewed the 
cases as attempts to achieve price-£.xing, not wage-£.xing. This is not 
the occasion for a critical examination of the Court's independent en-
terpriser analysis, although this point is not free of difficulty as some 
of the cases (non-antitrust) involving services rather than products 
suggest. 32 One may agree with the committee, at least, that the 
Hutcheson doctrine does not seem to apply where there is no incident 
of an employment relationship at stake in the concerted action. 
The committee suggests further that cases such as Giboney v. Em-
pire Storage Co.33 tend to show by analogy that "a dispute involving 
the object of direct market control may not constitute a 'labor dispute' 
within Norris-LaGuardia .... "34 In the Giboney case the courts of 
Missouri held that picketing as part of a course of action designed to 
force an ice supplier to stop sales to non-union peddlers was enjoinable 
because the union sought thereby to force the supplier to violate the 
state's antitrust laws. The only question presented to the Supreme 
Court was whether this injunction was forbidden under the picketing-
free speech principle declared in the Thornhill35 case. Clearly, the 
Court, in holding that the civil rights of the union were not violated by 
the injunction, did not purport to say that similar union conduct in-
volving interstate commerce would be violative of the Sherman Act or 
would be subject to injunction despite the Norris Act. The commit-
tee's point, however, may be simply that the Court, by indicating its 
willingness to permit a state to give effect to its antitrust policies in 
cases involving union activity, thereby suggested that it may be ready 
to narrow further the "labor dispute" definition of the Norris Act. 
This interpretation of the case is a bit fanciful. 
The final proposition of the committee is that a union engaged 
in commercial restraints may be vulnerable to antitrust proceedings 
where it "combines with some nonlabor group to effect some direct 
commercial restraint."36 This conclusion is clearly warranted by Al-
len-Bradley. Also warranted is the view that section 6 of the Norris 
32 See, e.g.: NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944); 
Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 
U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463 
(1947). 
33 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949). 
34 REPORT 298. 
ar; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). 
36 REPORT 300. 
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Act, as construed in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America v. United States,37 places serious obstacles in the path of the 
government or a private party in attempting to enforce against unions 
even those limited types of Sherman Act liability which still exist. 
The problem is to connect the union with the conduct of individual 
members or officers. It is noteworthy tkat the burden of proof here is 
much heavier than would be the case under ordinary agency principles 
or, indeed, under Taft-Hartley.38 This fact underlines further the 
point that existing possibilities of antitrust coverage of trade union 
conduct are limited. 
The Survey of Relevant Provisions of T afe-Hartley 
· In its brief survey of Taft-Hartley in relation to the problem of 
market restraints, the committee mentions only the so-called ''boycott" 
provisions of the act and points out that these reach union activities 
aimed at suppressing commercial competition in some circumstances, 
but not in others. Such activities are covered where they involve the 
elements of liability prescribed by section 8(b )( 4) of Title I. There 
must be a strike or an inducement of employees to strike or to refuse, 
in the course of their e~ployment, to handle goods or perform services, 
where an object is some one of those proscribed. The broadest of the 
proscribed objects is stated in clause (A), and includes, in substance, 
forcing one employer to cease doing business with another person. 
"Commercial restraints," as defined by the committee, are not spe-
cificially a proscribed object, but it is clear that if a union, in order to 
effect a commercial restraint, engages, for example, in secondary strike 
action, it violates the act. Primary concerted action, secondary action 
by persons otherwise than in the course of their employment, and sec-
37 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775 (1947). 
38 Thus, §6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides: 
"No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organ-
ization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in 
any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or 
agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such 
acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof." 47 Stat. L. 71 (1932), 
29 u.s.c. (1952) §106. 
On the other hand, §2 of Title I of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 
in e.'Cpressing what amounts to standard agency doctrine, states: 
''When used in this Act-
"(13) In determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person 
so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific 
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." 
67 Stat. L. 139, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §152 (13). 
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ondary action not undertaken by the use of strike threats (for example, 
direct appeals to consumers or suppliers) are not covered by this 
provision even though intended to achieve commercial restraints. It 
is therefore true, as the committee states, that commercial restraints are 
covered under some circumstances but not others. 
The committee does not mention section 8(b)(6) of Title I. This 
so-called "anti-featherbedding provision" makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or 
deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in 
the nature of an exaction for services which are not performed or not 
to be performed." Perhaps the committee's recommendations do not 
encompass union "featherbedding'' demands. The proposal is to 
reach "only specific union activities which have as their direct object 
control of the market, such as 6.xing the kind or amount of products 
which may be used ... ," and a demand for the employment of stand-
by or unnecessary labor, as a response to technological change, could 
be considered as an indirect, rather than a direct, attempt to limit the 
kind of products which may be used. If so, the point is interesting in 
the light of the fact that the Thurman Arnold antitrust-labor policy 
as promulgated in 1939 contemplated that this type of union restraint 
should be subject to antitrust proceedings. 39 Possibly the committee 
considers the Taft-Hartley attack upon this problem to be adequate, 
or at least as expressing the extent of national policy, despite the limited 
interpretation of section 8(b)(6) which the Supreme Court has ap-
proved.40 
In general it is the conclusion of the committee that the Taft-Hart-
ley Act provides incomplete protection against union action which 
seeks commercial restraints. Moreover, the committee makes the point 
that, unlike the Sherman Act, proceedings under the Taft-Hartley Act 
may not be initiated by the government in the absence of formal com-
plaints, and this is considered to be a weakness. There is no question 
as to the accuracy of the committee's judgment concerning the ade-
quacy of Taft-Hartley from the point of view of the objectives which 
39 Among the types of "unreasonable restraint" which were thought to be "unques-
tionable violations of the Sherman Act" (as of 1939) were "unreasonable restraints de-
signed to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary labor." See Mr. Arnold's letter to 
the Central Labor Union, AFL, of Indianapolis, 5 LAB. REL. REP. 316-317 (1939), re-
printed in SMITH's CAsBs AND MATERIALS ON LABoR LAw, 2d ed., 408 (1953). 
40 In American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 73 S.Ct. 552 
(1953), and NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117, 73 S.Ct. 560 (1953), the 
Court agreed with the NLRB that §8(b)(6) should not be construed to reach demands by 
a union that the employer hire unwanted labor. Thus, unless the demand is that the 
employer pay for services not offered, the section will not apply. 
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the committee considers desirable. As the committee points out, the 
framers evidently believed that the new unfair labor practice provisions 
written into the law would reach broadly the types of undesirable union 
conduct which constituted the most serious problems. They wrote 
this law at a time when the extent of antitrust coverage of union 
activities was uncertain. Evidently, they elected not to focus specifi-
cally on the subject of commercial restraints. 
The Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations 
The committee recommends "appropriate legislation" to prohibit 
union efforts "at outright market control," to the extent that "such 
commercial restraints" are not effectively curbed either by the anti-
trust laws or by the Labor-Management Relations Act.41 "Regarding 
such legislation," the committee makes three points: (a) the legislation 
"should cover only specific union activities" having as their "direct" 
object commercial restraints of the kinds mentioned; (b) the govern-
ment should be empowered to proceed against such restraints "on its 
own initiative"; and (c) the legislation "should not contain provisions 
for private injunction." Thus, the committee takes no position on 
the question whether the proposed legislation should be incorporated 
in the antitrust laws, the Taft-Hartley Act, or a separate statute. Cer-
tain of the suggested remedial characteristics of the new law would 
depart from the pattern of either existing law. 
The Report states, as its first recommendation, that the legislation 
"should cover only specific union activities which have as their direct 
object direct control of the market, such as fixing the kind or amount of 
products which may be used, produced or sold, their market price, the 
geographical area_ in which they may be sold, or the number of firms 
which may engage in their production or distribution."42 The Adams 
dissent objects that "to the extent that the limits of challenged union 
conduct are defined in terms of 'object' (i.e., intent), the proposal is 
subject to potential abuse," and that "unlike the Taft-Hartley Act, it 
does not pinpoint specific malpractices in terms of a clearly delineated 
course of conduct."43 Mr. Adams may be correct in his apprehensions. 
On the other hand, the committee may have in mind that the legisla-
tion should specify concretely the "specific union activities" which 
would be illegal. This point is left unclear by the Report, although it 
41 REPORT 304. 
42 Ibid. 
43 REPORT 305. 
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may be supposed that some considerable difficulty would be encount-
ered in framing statutory language which would be more "specific." 
Certainly it is apparent that a statutory formula in the language 
used in the recommendation would present some interesting litigious 
possibilities. Under the proposal union action, to be covered by the 
prohibition, would have to have as its "direct'' object "direct" control 
of the market. By way of example, the use of the word "direct" as a 
dual modifier (or qualifier) could produce an interesting question 
whether the Coronado type of union conduct (tortious strike action 
intended either to force unionization, or to keep non-union products 
out of an interstate market in order to protect union wage scales) 
would be considered as having as a direct (or only an indirect) object 
direct (or only indirect) control of market price. Similarly, the ques-
tion could arise whether the refusal of union workers to use certain 
labor-saving machinery (for example, the refusal of painters to use 
spray guns or rollers) would be considered as having as its direct ob-
ject direct control of the "kind" of products produced or sold, or, on 
the other hand, as directly intended simply to preserve work for union 
members. Again, the question might be whether union-imposed pro-
duction standards ( daily or hourly work limitations, for example, in 
the case of craftsmen) could be considered a form of "direct control" 
of the "amount of products which may be used," and, if so, whether a 
"direct object" of the union action. Too broad and loose an applica-
tion of the suggested standard could result in the attempted prohibi-
tion of some kinds of union action which stern from considerations of 
self-interest and which, though possibly prejudicial to the interests of 
others, are nevertheless within the general privilege now accorded to 
labor. 
I do not suggest that these illustrative questions should be decided 
one way or the other. I do believe, however, that in the area of labor 
relations law it is especially important for the legislator to think out 
clearly the policy which he proposes to write into law, and put the 
policy into language which will not require very much "filling in" by 
the judiciary. If the statutory language must, perforce, be cast in 
general terms out of sheer necessity or desperation, then I suggest that 
the legislative history should show as completely as possible, perhaps 
by enumeration of concrete illustrative exarnples,44 the kinds of cases 
44 See, for example, the detailed pre-enactment consideration of the contemplated 
impact of certain amendments of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Conference Report, H. 
Rep. 1453 on H.R. 5856, 81st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 14 and 15 (1949). 
1132 MmmGAN LAw R.Evrnw [ Vol. 53 
intended to be covered and excluded from coverage. Otherwise, the 
courts will have the difficult task of reconciling competing and at times 
conflicting general statutory policies. The history of our labor law 
shows that this kind of abdication of legislative responsibility is both 
unfair and unwise. 
The committee has performed a useful function in its limited 
treatment of the "antitrust" aspects of trade unionism, even though its 
principal proposal needs further elucidation and examination. The 
committee has demonstrated that there are areas of uncertainty in our. 
national policy which should be clari:6.ed, and its work should stimulate 
the further detailed consideration which the development of a sound 
policy will require. 
